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1. Introduction 
Switzerland does not have a National Health Service like Italy and Great Britain, nor is 
its system based on a public insurance scheme like in France and Germany. The Swiss 
health care system is based upon a mixed insurance model. On the one hand, competing 
private non-profit companies are responsible for health insurance, and on the other hand, 
the system incorporates some elements that are normally adopted within the context of a 
social insurance, such as mandatory insurance for all residents, regulated and risk-
independent premiums, public subsidies to the less wealthy for the payment of the 
insurance premiums. In an unusual health care context such as the Swiss one, the decision-
making autonomy of the single cantons, reinforced by fiscal federalism, has led to a highly 
heterogeneous system. This heterogeneity applies both to the production capacity and to 
the specific weight which each canton attributes to the various forms of health care 
provision (for example to public versus private hospitals or nursing homes). Instead of 
being a single health care system, Switzerland can be therefore considered an ensemble of 
26 sub-systems, connected to each other by the Federal Law on Health Insurance (FLHI).  
In contrast with the majority of European countries, where the financial contribution of 
the State to the health care expenditure is significant, the Swiss system provides for a 
rather limited public participation. Moreover, the mandatory health insurance premiums 
are independent of income and citizens finance 42% of total health expenditure directly or 
by means of private insurances. This situation leads to a highly regressive financing of 
health care expenses. 
In recent years many proposals have been formulated in the Swiss political arena, all 
aimed at reforming the financing of the mandatory health insurance. Among others, a 
popular ballot, which will take place in May 2003, invites the Swiss population to support 
the introduction of income and wealth dependent health insurance premiums. The goals of 
this study are: (1) to briefly describe the Swiss health care system, paying particular 
attention to the issue of equity in the financing of health care; (2) to show the consequences 
of federalism and wide-ranging cantonal autonomy in a particular health insurance context 
such as the Swiss one, in terms of interregional inequalities in per capita health care 
expenditure and in production capacity; (3) to investigate the willingness of the Swiss 
citizens to foster more equity in the finance of health care and (4) to empirically test the 
theory of Margolis (1982), whose fair-share model suggests that spending in group interest 
should behave as a superior good (i.e. willingness to pay for collective interest – such as 
the case of a mandatory health insurance system - should rise as the income of individuals 
increases).  
This paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we introduce some considerations on 
the nature of the patient’s utility functions and we briefly describe the fair-share model 
developed by Margolis in 1982; in section 3 we present the main features of the Swiss 
health care system and show the consequences of federalism on the organization of the 
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health care sector in Switzerland; section 4 is devoted to a short presentation of the reform 
proposals presently under discussion in Switzerland, which aim at achieving more equity 
in the financing of health care; in section 5 the specification of the model is discussed, 
while the data set and the empirical estimation results are presented in section 6; 
conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
2. Some considerations on the utility of spending for merit goods like health care  
Some experimental and empirical evidence has been collected on the following puzzle: 
in many situations people spontaneously contribute to the financing of public or merit 
goods, although free-riding is a viable option, the return appears inconsequential and the 
effect of one’s personal contribution to the society’s well-being is microscopic [see e.g. 
Andreoni and Scholz (1998), Andreoni (1995)].  
According to Margolis (1982) in these situations it is important to distinguish between 
two classes of goods: private goods on the one hand, and public or merit goods2 on the 
other hand. Margolis supposes that the utility function of individuals includes two 
components that comply with two different logics. Individuals value the consumption of 
private goods and services in a selfish way, but at the same time they value collective 
spending on merit and public goods from a group’s point of view. As members of a given 
community, they derive well-being from the amount of resources which are devoted to 
group- interest issues, but subject to the condition that they are personally "doing their fair 
share" and contributing, so that everyone enjoys equal access to group- interest services. 
Therefore, Margolis assumes the utility function U=U(S,G), with S representing the utility 
of the individual from the point of view of pure self- interest and G the utility from the 
point of view of pure group- interest.  
The logic of the utility maximization model is the following: each member of the 
community has an initial endowment of financial resources that should be divided into two 
spending alternatives: the maximization of S-utility (s), and the maximization of G-utility 
(g). The allocation decision depends on two factors: the ratio between the marginal utility 
of spending in group- interest and the marginal utility of spending in self- interest (G’/S’) 
and a weighting function W, which varies positively with the participation ratio g/s of the 
individual (in other terms the likelihood of spending an additional Euro for self- interest 
rather than for group- interest increases as g/s grows).3 The fair-share model developed by 
Margolis has a simple theoretical implication: g, i.e. spending in group- interest, is a 
superior good. As the endowment of a given individual increases (e.g. from I1 to I2 in 
Figure 1), spending for group- interest increases more than proportionally, leading to the 
upward-bending income-spending path illustrated in figure 1. 
                                                 
2 Margolis calls this second class of goods “group-interest”. 
3 “The larger the share of my resources I have spent unselfishly, the more weight I give to my selfish interests 
in allocating marginal resources. On the other hand, the larger benefit I can confer on group compared with 
the benefit from spending marginal resources on myself, the more I will tend to act unselfishly” (Margolis, 
1982, p. 36). 
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Figure 1 The equilibrium income-spending path in the Margolis “fair-share” model   
 
Margolis’ model can be useful for the analysis of health care services, which are 
generally considered merit goods.4 The demand for health care broadly reflects the utility 
that individuals draw from their health, whereas health represents a prerequisite for most 
human activities. For this reason many societies consider health care services as merit 
goods. Generally the State promotes two dimensions of equity through the health care 
system: horizontal equity (citizens with the same medical needs should receive the same 
treatment, even if they belong to different age and sex classes or ethnical groups) and 
vertical equity (the demand for basic health care should not depend on the patients’ ability 
to pay). In most OECD count ries the emphasis given to equity has two major 
consequences: a significant public participation in the financing of health care and the 
development of a package of medical services which should be granted to the whole 
population. In order to guarantee that social citizenship is offered to everybody, citizens 
participate (through taxes or through social health insurance contributions) to the financing 
of health care services. In the case of federal states like Switzerland, the two dimensions of 
equity should be attained in the same way in all the country’s regions.  
Banting and Corbett (2002) illustrated that federal states offer a particularly intriguing 
context. In federal states, the central government faces a trade-off between two social 
values: (1) a commitment to social citizenship, to be achieved through a common set of 
public health care services for citizens across the entire country, and (2) respect for 
regional communities and cultures, to be achieved through decentralized decision-making 
                                                 
4 It is important to recognize the particular nature of the commodity “health care” (see Arrow, 1963). Health 
care per se has little utility. If any satisfaction is associated with medical services, this occurs with higher 
likelihood in the case of ill people, the productivity of health care being state-dependent (see Zweifel and 
Breyer, 1997).   
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and significant room for manoeuvre at the regional level in the health care sector. Using 
the case study approach, the authors have proved that the regional variations in health care 
supply (e.g. the number of hospital beds or doctors per 1,000 inhabitants) and in per capita 
health care spending are not very large in the the five federations analyzed (Belgium, 
Germany, Australia, United States and Canada). The result is fairly surprising because it 
holds even in federal states where the decision-making power in the health care sector has 
been strongly delegated to regional authorities or where the resort to interregional 
redistribution by means of financial transfers is very low. It seems that policy-makers in 
the five countries are committed to granting comparable access to health services and to 
limiting interregional inequalities in health care spending despite the importance of 
diversity embedded in the logic of federalism. However, as we will illustrate in the next 
section, in Switzerland there is a marked heterogeneity between cantons in terms of 
vertical equity. Moreover, two features of the Swiss health care system distinguish it from 
those of other European countries: (1) highly regressive health care financing (due to the 
very limited public financial participation and to income-independent insurance premiums) 
and (2) the existence of significant differences among cantons in per capita health care 
spending and in production capacity.  
One of the objectives of this paper is to assess whether Swiss citizens would favor a 
more equitable financing system and in particular if they are willing to introduce income-
dependent health insurance premiums. According to Margolis’ fair-share model we should 
expect growing willingness-to-pay for socialized health care expenditure, since health care 
services are usually considered merit goods, as income increases. In our case we were not 
able to test directly the relationship between income and the desire to contribute to social 
health care spending. However, the willingness of the superior income classes to adopt 
income-dependent insurance premiums can be interpreted as a proxy for their higher 
willingness to contribute to the financing of health care services.   
3. The Swiss health care system 
The main features of the Swiss health care system are the following:  
- the system is based on a private insurance model, with about 100 competing insurance 
companies on the one hand and some social characteristics on the other hand;  
- since 1996 the health insurance has been mandatory for all residents;  
- the rights of the insured are laid down in the individual insurance contracts; since 1996 
the basic contract has been the same for all residents by law;  
- both public and private hospitals and nursing homes offer inpatient health care, which 
(in most cases) is still reimbursed on a per diem base; 
- ambulatory health care services provided by freelance general practitioners and 
specialists are reimbursed according to a fee-for-service scheme;  
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- the insured can freely choose the service-provider (general practitioner, specialist); 
- the service fees are regulated and defined according to agreements concluded between 
the service providers association, the health insurance companies and the State;  
- the financial contribution of the State (Swiss Confederation, cantons and local 
authorities) to the health care system is very limited (subsidies to public- interest 
hospital structures, subsidies to the low income classes for the payment of the 
mandatory health insurance premiums).  
The financing model and the allocation of competences between the Confederation and 
Cantons  
In 1999 a meager 25% of the total health care expenditure was covered by general 
taxation. 5 Moreover, the public contribution was predominantly provided by cantons and 
municipalities, whereas the Confederation contributed with only 10% to the public health   
care budget (see figure 2). The rest was financed by the mandatory (income and risk-
independent) health insurance premiums (26%), by contributions to other forms of social 
insurance (6.5%), such as income-proportional deductions from salary for accidents. 
Citizens finance 42% of the health care costs directly (cost-participation and deductible 
amount from the invoices covered by the mandatory insurance, additional private insurance 
premiums and insurance-exempted services).  
Figure 2 Distribution of public health care spending between Confederation, Cantons 
and Municipalities, 1970-2000   
Source: UFS, Finances publiques en Suisse, Neuchâtel, over  many years. 
Switzerland’s peculiarity is highlighted in the triangle of the health care financing 
reproduced in figure 3. The closer a country is to the triangle’s hypotenuse, the higher the 
                                                 
5 This quota is divided into shares of 15.4% for public financing of hospitals and nursing homes, 8.7% for 
subsidies to the less wealthy citizens in form of a State contribution to the payment of the mandatory health 
insurance premiums and of the nursing homes’ daily rates, and 1.5% for public subsidies to other social 
insurances that participate in the health care expenditure.  
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health care expenditure share financed according to the citizens’ paying ability 
(progressive general taxation or proportional payroll taxes). The closer it is to the right 
angle, the greater the use of private financing schemes.   
 
Figure 3 Health care financing triangle  
  Source: Wagstaff et al (1999).  
Switzerland’s position is in clear contrast with all the other European countries (which 
are all within a range of public financing between 65% to 80% of health care expenditure) 
and shows some similarities with the situation in the United States. This particular health 
care financing scheme has two main consequences:  
- the Swiss health care system does not give much importance to the principle of 
equity of financing. 6 In fact, the more part of health care costs is progressively 
financed or at least proportionally to income, the more equal the health care system 
financing is. The fact that the mandatory health insurance premiums are 
independent of income and that citizens have to finance directly (or through private 
insurances) 42% of total expenditure, leads to a highly regressive financing model.7 
This has negative repercussions especially on the middle class, which does not 
benefit from subsidies for the payment of the insurance premiums; 
- the presence of a large number of third-party payers makes it extremely complex to 
follow the financial flows, which in turn makes it more difficult to manage the 
health care expenditure in general, and leads to a "cost shifting" problem in 
particular. Since nobody is responsible for the global health care budget, it is 
sometimes easier for a single financing body to obtain a reduction in its own 
                                                 
6 Because of its marked iniquity of financing, in 2000 the Swiss system ranked twentieth in an international 
comparison on the performance of health care systems, commissioned by the World Health Organisation.   
7 Wagstaff et al. (1999) have published a comparative study on the equity of financing in OECD countries, 
where Switzerland ranked last. 
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financial share than to engage in a more rational use of total health care spending. 
This encourages a shifting of the costs at the expense of another payer, rather than 
the search for solutions that would allow an effective rationalisation of expenditure.  
Although the State’s presence in the Swiss health care system cannot be considered to 
be very strong in financial terms, it is definitely stronger in terms of activity regulation.  As 
far as allocation of competences is concerned, the cantons are legally entitled to legislate 
on all health care matters except for a few issues that explicitly fall within the competence 
of the Confederation. Almost all cantons have drawn up cantonal health care laws and 
some provisions that regulate the application of the Federal health care legislation. 
According to the Constitution each canton enjoys decision-making autonomy in the 
planning of health care institutions (in particular hospitals and nursing homes), in deciding 
which competences are to be delegated to the local authorities and with regard to 
vocational training.  Since 1996, when the Federal Law on Health Insurance (FLHI) was 
introduced, the Confederation has played a more active role in the health care sector. 
However, the additional decision-making power of the central body was not sustained by a 
formal devolution of competences from the cantons to the Confederation (which would 
have required a change in the Constitution) nor by a redistribution of the public health care 
expenditure towards a greater engagement of the Confederation (see Crivelli and Filippini, 
2003). 
The organizational autonomy granted to the cantons for 90 years has created a very 
heterogeneous picture both in the provision of health care services and in the level of 
financing, giving rise to a relevant issue of social and territorial inequity.  
Such a marked decentralisation of financing and of the provision of health care does 
not have any term of comparison in other countries with a federal setting such as Canada 
and Germany. In these countries the central governments play a more active role in the 
financing of the health care sector. Moreover, since the regional entities in these countries 
are much larger than the Swiss cantons, the regional differences are not as marked and the 
problems connected to the presence of mini-systems are not as significant.  
Consequences of federalism on the organisation of the health care system in Switzerland  
Decentralisation of competences and of expenditure and the strong autonomy of the 26 
cantonal health care sub-systems has led to a series of significant inter-cantonal differences 
with regard to public financing and the regulatory settings as well as to production 
capacity.  
The first sign of wide-ranging disparities among the Cantons can be found in the per 
capita public health expenditure (figure 4), which can be calculated by adding two 
fundamental elements: (a) the cantonal and local direct financing for the provision of 
health care services to the population (in particular the subsidies to public and private, 
public- interest hospitals, the participation in hospitalizations outside the home Canton, the 
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subsidies to nursing homes and to home care services) and (b) the contributions to the less 
wealthy in the form of subsidies for the payment of the health insurance premiums (it is 
important to stress that each canton is entitled to develop its own model for the granting of 
subsidies and, within a framework set by the Confederation, they can also decide how 
many public funds should flow in this direction). 
In 2000 per capita public health expenditure ranged from 278 Euro per capita in  
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (AI)8 to 1440 Euro in Geneva (GE). It is important to remember 
that this indicator (financial contributions from the cantons and the local authorities) only 
represents one part of the total expenditure for basic health care services. The expenses 
covered by the mandatory insurance, which is financed by means of income-independent 
insurance premiums, have to be added.  
Figure 4 Per capita public health expenditure (direct payments + subsidies to the 
mandatory insurance) and expenses covered by the mandatory insurance in the 
various cantons (2000) 
Source: UFS (2002), Coûts du système de santé, Neuchâtel. UFAS (2002), Statistiques de 
l'assurance-maladie 2000, Berne. 
The notable differences registered in the public health expenditure are to be found once 
again in the expenses covered by the mandatory health insurance, as shown in figure 4. By 
adding the two expenditure items the socialized health expenditure is obtained, which 
                                                 
8 All the cantons’ acronyms and names can be found in table 1.  
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ranged from a peak of 3290 Euro per capita in Basle-Town to a low of 910 Euro in 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes in the year 2000. 
If we consider the financing of the health insurance (the level of the premiums) instead 
of considering the expenses it covers, we can see significant differences between the 
various Cantons (figure 5) and at the same time disparities within the single Cantons (the 
basic health insurance is offered by several insurance companies, which calculate the ir 
premiums on a Cantonal basis). The box-plot shows the median, maximum and minimum 
premium values for each canton and the concentration of the distribution of the premiums 
paid by 50% of the cantonal population (the box-plot rectangle shows the dispersion 
between the first and the third quartile). The highest premium of all (more than 270 Euro 
per month) was paid in Canton Geneva, the lowest (less than 90 Euro) was paid in Valais 
(VS). The highest median value (about 225 Euro) is to be found in Geneva, whereas the 
lowest median value (about 108 Euro) can be found in Appenzell Inner-Rhodes.  
 
Figure 5 Inter-cantonal and infra-cantonal differences in adult premiums (2002) 
 Source: UFAS (2002), Statistiques de l'assurance-maladie 2000, Berne.  
By combining these first two indicators we obtain interesting data concerning the 
socialized health expenditure financed by general taxation rather than by income-
independent premiums. The highest percentage can be measured in Geneva (with 46%), 
the lowest in Thurgovia (TG), where only 26% of the socialized health expenses were  
financed by tax revenues. If we consider the threshold of those entitled to subsidies for the 
mandatory health insurance premiums in relation to the average cantonal premium, we 
obtain an even more accurate indicator of the degree of financing equity and of the 
economic burden that the health insurance premiums represent for the middle class. If we 
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take a married couple without children, this threshold ranged from 23,000 Euro of taxable 
income in Canton Ticino (TI) to 54,240 Euro in Basle-Country (BL).  
There are also very marked differences between cantons with regard to production 
capacity in the health care sector. The first aspect we would like to consider is the density 
of acute beds (table 1). The national average is 4.5 acute beds per 1,000 inhabitants, but 
there are 3 Cantons that exceed this average by over 35% [Ticino: 6.4 beds; Appenzell 
Inner-Rhodes: 7.3 beds and Basle-Town (BS): 8.1 beds], and 4 Cantons that have a density 
lower than the national average by over 35% [Zug (ZG), Schwyz (SZ) and Thurgovia 
(TG): 2.9 beds; Nidwalden (NW): 2.5 beds].  
 
Table 1 Density of acute beds per 1,000 inhabitants and density of medical practices per 
10,000 inhabitants (year 2000) 
 Canton 
Density of acute 
beds per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Density of medical 
practices per  
10,000 inhabitants 
Canton 
Density of acute 
beds per 1,000 
inhabitants  
Density of 
medical 
practices per  
10,000 
inhabitants 
Argovia (AG) 4.2 13.9 Nidwalden (NW) 2.5 10.6 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes 
(AI) 7.3 11.0 Obwalden (OW) 3.5 9.9 
Appenzell Outer-Rhodes 
(AR) 3.2 15.2 St Gall (SG) 3.8 15.3 
Berne (BE) 4.7 19.8 Schaffhausen (SH) 3.6 18.7 
Basle-Country (BL) 3.6 18.6 Solothurn (SO) 4.1 15.3 
Basle-Town (BS) 8.1 35.7 Schwyz (SZ) 2.9 11.5 
Fribourg (FR) 4.0 14.2 Thurgovia (TG) 2.9 12.6 
Geneva (GE) 4.5 32.2 Ticino (TI) 6.4 18.8 
Glarus (GL) 3.6 12.5 Uri (UR) 4.9 13.0 
Grisons (GR) 4.6 16.6 Vaud (VD) 5.3 23.8 
Jura (JU) 4.7 14.9 Valais (VS) 4.1 16.8 
Lucerne (LU) 3.8 14.1 Zug (VS) 2.9 16.5 
Neuchâtel (NE) 4.3 20.1 Zurich (ZH) 4.6 21.9 
Swiss average 4.5 19.3 
 Source: UFS, Informations sur le projet "Statistiques des établissements de santé (soins intra -muros), 
StatSanté 1/2002, 29 and Bollettino dei medici svizzeri, 2001; 82: Nr 21 
There is a real gap with respect to the density of medical practices. The data range from 
more than 30 medical practices per 10,000 inhabitants in Basle-Town and Geneva to 10-11 
practices per 10,000 inhabitants in Obwalden (OW), Nidwalden, Appenzell Inner-Rhodes 
and Schwyz, whereas the national average is 19.3.  In Switzerland all doctors who have 
obtained a Swiss university degree in medicine and have at least two years’ hospital 
experience are automatically entitled to practice independently and to invoice their services 
at the expense of the mandatory health insurance according to a fee-for-service scheme 
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(the fees are fixed on a cantonal basis in a specific price list for medical services). 9 This 
easily leads to a phenomenon of supply- induced demand.  
Another difference that emerges among the Swiss cantons is the frequency of the 
institutional forms in the hospital sector. In figure 6 a pie-chart has been drawn within each 
canton.  The pie surface corresponds to the total number of hospitals operating in a specific 
canton, whereas the 2 pie slices represent the relative weight of public and private 
subsidized hospitals in comparison with non-subsidized private institutions. The public-
private mix has a strong impact on the financing model of mandatory health care. The 
higher the percentage of private beds in a canton, the higher the share covered by means of 
the health insurance premiums (do not forget that they are income-independent).  
 
Figure 6: Comparison between public or subsidized, private acute hospitals and private 
clinics in the different Swiss Cantons (year 2000) 
 
Source:  UFS, Informations sur le projet "Statistiques des établissements de santé (soins 
intra-muros), StatSanté 1/2002, 17. 
Consequently the cantons contribute less to the total expenditure, as they only have to 
subsidize beds in public and public- interest hospitals. Therefore the cantons can reduce the 
revenues of general taxation (and taxes are collected progressively according to the tax-
payers’ income). More private beds thus imply, ceteris paribus, a greater iniquity of 
financing. In this sense the hospital situation in Ticino, Thurgovia, Geneva and Appenzell 
Outer-Rhodes appears to be rather peculiar, as it is characterized by a clear prevalence of 
private non-subsidised hospitals. 
                                                 
9 The health insurance companies are obliged to cooperate with all the medical practitioners entitled to 
practice independently within the framework of the coverage provided for by the Federal law on health 
insurance. Service-providers can be excluded from the reimbursement of the mandatory health insurance only 
in the case of citizens who have voluntarily joined a managed care insurance scheme.  
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All the indicators presented in this paper concern expenditure, the organizational levels 
and schemes of the health care sector in the various cantons. This analysis clearly fails to 
consider the effectiveness factor (outcome indicators), which would make it possible to 
determine whether such different expenditure and activity levels lead to a proportional 
difference with regard to the population’s health conditions and degree of  satisfaction. In 
the light of the difficult task of measuring the effectiveness of a health care system, on the 
basis of few simple indicators such as mortality amenable to medical intervention, the 
population’s degree of satisfaction concerning the cantonal health care system (see figure 
7) and the subjective rationing perception (like the indicator of waiting lists, virtually non-
existent in all cantons)10, it is possible to conclude that there are no significant 
effectiveness gaps in Switzerland at present.  
Figure 7 Correlation between average satisfaction and per capita expenditure of the 
mandatory health insurance in Swiss cantons (2002)11 
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This conclusion emphasizes the wide-ranging differences with respect to the single 
cantons’ performances in terms of the cost-effectiveness ratio. In fact, the per capita health 
care expenses are much higher in some cantons than in others, even though the 
effectiveness level is very much the same. The differences in the per capita health care 
expenses could be partially caused by an excessive production capacity (high density of 
                                                 
10 For a more complete illustration of some of these indicators for 6 groups of cantons see Domenighetti and 
Crivelli (2001). 
11 The figure highlights the results of a survey carried out in September 2002 on 1128 households based in 
Switzerland. Among others the following question was asked: “In general, would you say that you are very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way 
health care is run in  your canton”?. The satisfaction index was constructed by weighting the five possible 
answers with 2, 1, 0, -1 and -2 points, respectively. Some small cantons had to be aggregated in order to 
achieve a sufficient number of observations. 
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medical practices and hospital beds) and therefore they could be the consequence of a 
situation of supply induced demand.  
In conclusion, the Swiss health care system seems to guarantee a satisfying level of 
equity of access to the health care services, while lacking equity both at the individual and 
the territorial level with regard to the system’s financing.  In table 2 a summary of the 
differences between the Swiss cantons is presented and an attempt is made to explain the 
reasons. 
 
Table 2 Summary of the disparities existing at the cantonal level 
 Situation Possible reasons  
Horizontal equity 
No significant differences 
(the outcome is  fairly 
homogeneous) 
The central government defines the 
package of health care services that ought 
to be granted to the whole population  
Mandatory health 
insurance premiums  
Differences among cantons and, 
within the same cantons, 
between the insurance 
companies  
federalism,  
lack of competition in the health insurance 
system 
limited planning on the supply side,  
inappropriate incentives 
Public subs idies for the 
payment of health 
insurance premiums  
Marked differences among 
cantons 
federalism 
Per capita “socialized” 
health care expenditure  
Marked differences among 
cantons 
federalism,  
limited planning on the supply side,  
inappropriate incentives 
Production capacity 
and regulatory settings 
Marked differences among 
cantons 
federalism,  
limited planning on the supply side,  
inappropriate incentives 
 
4. Proposals for a reform   
People in Switzerland are, in general, fairly satisfied with the way the health system in 
their country is run. 12 In a survey carried out in September 2002 among a sample of 1128 
respondents, 21% said they were “very satisfied” and 45.1% “fairly satisfied” with the way 
health care is run in this country. On a European scale these percentages – see table 3 – can 
be compared with the results yielded in 1996 by the Eurobarometer survey of citizens’ 
views on health care systems (see Mossialos, 1997). Only in Denmark was the rate of 
“very satisfied” respondents higher than in Switzerland. By adding the percentages of the  
“very satisfied” and “fairly satisfied”, Switzerland (with 66.93%) would drop from the 
                                                 
12 Switzerland can be regarded as the world’s greatest “health shopping center” because there are almost no 
barriers to the access to medical and/or health services. 
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second to the seventh place in a hypothetical European ranking; it would be overshadowed 
not only by Denmark (90.0%) but also by Finland (86.4%), Holland (72.8%), Luxemburg 
(71.1%), Belgium (71.1%) and Sweden (67.3%). The main limitation of these comparisons 
lies in the fact that people voice their opinions on the basis of their personal experiences 
(which are in general limited to the own health care system) and of the expectations they 
place in the system, whereas expectations are endogenous, i.e. they tend to increase as the 
perceived quality of the health system itself improves. 
Table 3 Satisfaction concerning the health care system in Switzerland, 2002 
 Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
Very satisfied 21.81% 21.81% 
Fairly satisfied 45.12% 66.93% 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 15.43% 82.36% 
Fairly dissatisfied 10.90% 93.26% 
Very dissatisfied 3.99% 97.25% 
Do not know 2.75% 100.00% 
This satisfaction on the health care delivery front is offset by the Swiss population’s 
growing concern regarding the constant increase of health expenditure and in particular the 
share of costs financed by the premiums of the mandatory health insurance. Indeed, 
between 1996 - the year in which universal health insurance became compulsory under 
Federal law – and 2002, premiums rose by 62% on average in Switzerland. The 
population’s growing concern with respect to these massive increases is reflected in the 
difficulty that many families experience nowadays when it comes to paying health 
insurance premiums. As an example, table 4 displays the situation of two representative 
households (a couple without children and a couple with two children), both earning the 
Swiss median income of about 5000 Euro and living in Canton Ticino. For the year 2002 
we have calculated the amount that each household would pay in income taxes (including 
federal, cantonal and local taxes) and the amount it would pay in terms of the  mandatory 
health insurance premiums.  
Table 4 Proportion between spending on income taxes and health insurance premiums 
in the case of a representative household, 2002 
 Couple without children Couple with two 
children 
Family’s gross income  65000 € 65000 € 
Family’s taxable income  45333 € 34667 € 
 Federal income taxes 681 € 308 € 
 Cantonal income taxes 2743 € 1538 € 
 Local income taxes  2331 € 1307 € 
Total taxes 5755 € 3154 € 
Yearly health insurance premiums 4480 € 5680 € 
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In the case of the couple without children, the health insurance premiums total 78% of 
the amount spent on taxes, whereas in the case of the couple with two children premiums 
equal 1.8 times the amount spent on income taxes. This situation could undermine the 
social fabric and has ultimately prompted the political forces to work out proposals to 
amend current laws, with a view to introducing greater control and planning on the supply 
side (thus directly influencing the cost pattern), and providing for a more equitable 
financing mechanism on the other hand. 
None of these proposals has been endorsed by the Federal Parliament yet. One of the 
proposed changes is especially important, for if it were to be accepted, it would lead 
Switzerland, too, to adopt a form of income- and wealth-related financing of health 
insurance, thus maintaining the already existing equal access to health care and at the same 
time guaranteeing a fair financing method. This system would also be more in line with the 
models adopted by the other European countries. The proposal (a citizens’ initiative 
launched by the left wing and supported by labour unions and consumer organizations) 
would ensure – according to the proponents – the following financing rule for the 
compulsory health insurance expenditure: 60% based on personal income, 15% based on 
the personal wealth stock and 25% by means of a general VAT increase. 
Swiss citizens are to vote on this proposition on 18 May 2003. 
Two surveys run during the second half of 2002, among them the one that provided the  
data for the analysis presented in sections 5 and 6, have shown that a substantial majority 
of the Swiss (63%) are willing to pay health insurance premiums that depend 
proportionally on their income, though they are rather skeptical when it comes to 
supporting a VAT increase to finance the health sector. Table 5 illustrates the percentages 
of people in favor of income-dependent insurance premiums according to 6 income 
classes.  However, we have to point out that these results could also be influenced by other 
factors than income, e.g. family size or age. In the regression analysis, which we will 
present in sections 5 and 6, these factors will be taken into account. 
Table 5 Percentages of people favoring income-dependent health insurance premiums 
by income classes, 2002 
Income per month in favor contrary do not know 
Less than 2000 €  79.3% 13.8% 6.9% 
2000 € - 3000 € 72.9% 19.9% 7.2% 
3000 € - 4000 67.5% 20.7% 11.8% 
4000 € - 6000 € 57.6% 33.2% 9.2% 
6000 € - 9000 € 42.5% 54.5% 3.0% 
More than 9000 € 23.1% 69.2% 7.7% 
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The government and a majority of parliament are opposed to making health insurance 
premiums dependent on income and wealth and to shifting a part of the burden to indirect 
taxation, and they are calling on the population to turn down the proposition. 13  
The analysis we have presented here is based on data gathered in September 2002 and 
thus takes into account the early willingness of the citizens to accept income-related 
premiums, i.e. their stance prior to the actual start of the political and media campaign 
leading up to the balloting on this issue. This is highly interesting because the analysis in 
the wake of the people’s verdict of 18 May 2003 will make it possibile to measure how 
much the public debate on the contents of this popular ballot will have affected the results 
achieved in the earlier surveys, which are the subject of this analysis. 
5. Model specification  
The Binomial Logit model was used in this study. 14 The resort to this model is 
especially appropriate when working with dependent binary qualitative variables, built up 
from qualitative data obtained through surveys containing a wide range of questions 
concerning individual attitude, characteristics and behavior. In our case we are interested in 
identifying the most important factors that can explain the choice to support (dependent 
variable = 1) or not to support (dependent variable =0) the introduction of income 
dependent health insurance premiums in Switzerland. 
Several factors could potentially influence a person’s decision with respect to this 
proposal. Household income is an obvious candidate. We hypothesize, following Margolis’ 
thesis, that in the case of people with a higher income, the probability of a yes answer to 
the proposal of income dependent health insurance premiums will increase or remain the 
same. This means that the high income classes are more likely to support the proposal than 
the low income classes.  
In this analysis, we have also considered the following socio-economic factors that 
could influence an individual’s behaviour: age, gender, household size, employment, level 
of education. 
                                                 
13 Both the Parliament’s public health committee and the federal government in their respective reform 
proposals advocate maintaining the current premium system – not related to criteria such as risk and citizens’ 
financial capability. They suggest instead that the social issue should be solved by resorting more frequently 
to the subsidies the Confederation and the cantons are already paying to the less fortunate in order to help 
them finance their health insurance premiums. Both proposals substantially contemplate a threshold, (defined 
as a percentage ratio between the family’s health insurance costs and its taxable income) above which a 
family would automatically be eligible to receive these subsidies. 
14  For a general presentation of the logit model see Greene (2000). 
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The probability that an individual falls within the group of people in favor of the 
proposal concerning the introduction of income dependent health insurance premiums is 
defined by the following model15: 
176655443322110 DHSDYDYDYDYDYDYLi bbbbbbbb +++++++=
iuAGEDPREDACADGENDERDHSDHS +++++++ 131211103928 bbbbbb          (1)    
where 
Li  = unobserved dependent variable which takes on the value one if the 
household chooses to support the income dependent health insurance 
premium and zero if it does not 
DYa =  dummy variable indicating whether the person belongs to the income 
class a,  with a = 1,..,6; therefore, in our analysis, the income level of a 
person is measured using a series of dummy variables for different income 
classes; 
DHS1 = dummy variable indicating whether the person is living in a one-person 
household; 
DHS2 = dummy variable indicating whether the person is living in a two-person 
household; 
DHS3 = dummy variable indicating whether the person is living in a three-person 
or more household; 
DGENDER = dummy variable indicating the gender; 
DACA = dummy variable indicating whether the person has an academic degree; 
DPRE = dummy variable indicating whether the person is living in a canton where 
the level of the health insurance premiums is higher than the Swiss 
average; 
AGE = Age of the person 
ui = stochastic error term 
6. Data and estimation results 
The household micro data used in this study have been provided by a special survey 
carried out in Switzerland in 2002 by a private social research company. The questionnaire 
used for this survey was developed by the Department of Health and Social Affairs of the 
Canton Ticino in cooperation with the Istituto Mecop of the University of Lugano. The 
data were collected by phone interviews using a pre-coded questionnaire. The total sample 
                                                 
15 To recall that the sign of an estimated coefficients of the model (1) gives the direction of the effect of a 
change in the explanatory variable on the probability of a success ( an observation at one). 
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consists of 1128 households living in Switzerland. After correcting for missing values, the  
sample was reduced to 819 individuals for the total sample. This data set contains socio-
economic information on the individuals, as well as tastes and preferences from a list of 
proposals for a reform of the Swiss health system. The questionnaire included a specific 
question on the proposal concerning the introduction of income dependent health insurance 
premiums. 
Tables 6 and 7 give some statistical details on the variables employed in the estimation 
of the model (1). 
Table 6 Descriptions of the dummy variables 
 
Variable 
 
Condition for which the variable value is 
equal to one 
 
 
Frequency (%) 
 
 
DY1 
 
Individual in income class 1   < 3000 CHF) 
 
9.2 
DY2 Individual in income class 2   (3000-4500 CHF)                    18 
DY3 Individual in income class 3   (4500-6000 CHF)                    28.3 
DY4 Individual in income class 4   (6000-9000 CHF)                    28.1 
DY5 Individual in income class 5   (9000-15000 CHF)                    15.1 
DY6 Individual in income class 6   (> 15000  CHF)                    1.3 
DHS1 One-person household                    23.6 
DHS2 Two-person household 35.5 
DHS3 Three- and more person hosehold  40.9 
DGENDER Male  44.9 
DACA Individual with an academic degree 20.3 
DPRE Individual living in a canton with high premiums  52 
Table 7  Descriptive statistics on AGE 
Variable Min Median Mean Max 
AGE 18 44 46 74 
In table 8 we report the estimation results for the logit model specification (1). The 
statistical results are in line with most of the important coefficients significant.16 Moreover, 
the value of the Count R2, a fit measure for the estimated model, is fine. Therefore, our 
model performs quite well in predicting the individual’s choice. 
                                                 
16 For the econometric estimation we used LIMDEP, version 8. 
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Table 8  Estimated coefficients for the logit model 
Variable Coefficients t-ratio 
Constant                1.438  *** 2.860 
DY2              -0.599   -1.471 
DY3              -0.774  ** -1.991 
DY4              -1.521  *** -3.908 
DY5              -2.316  *** -5.576 
DY6              -2.983  *** -3.796 
DHS2               0.785  *** 3.401 
DHS3               0.464   ** 2.080 
AGE               0.002 0.335 
GENDER              -0.359  ** -2.161 
DACA              -0.279 -1.391 
DPRE               0.429** 2.627 
a. t-test of whether the coefficient is zero  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
        b.     Count R2 = 0.704 
The main aim of this empirical study is to identify the effect of income and income 
classes on the choice to support or not to support the proposal of income dependent health 
insurance premiums.17 Most coefficients of the dummy variables for the different income 
classes (DY2, DY3, DY4, DY5, DY6) are significantly different from zero and have a 
negative sign. These coefficients have to be interpreted with respect to the first income 
class (DY1), taken as a reference, which does not appear in the table. The absolute value of 
the coefficients of these variables increases with an increase of the income class. These 
negative coefficients suggest that, ceteris paribus, an increase in income is associated with 
a lower probability of a yes answer to the proposal of income dependent health insurance 
premiums. Therefore, these results show that the willingness to have a higher degree of 
equity in financing the health care system decreases as income increases. This result is 
confirmed by the analysis of the marginal effects for the income class dummy variables, 
which give the change in the probability of a yes (dependent variable=1) that results from 
changing a single dummy variable from zero to one, holding all other variables at some 
fixed values, e.g. at their mean values.18  
                                                 
17  The variables DY1 and DHS1 do not appear in the table because they are taken as  reference level, in 
order to avoid  the dummy variable trap. 
18 The values of the marginal effects are: -0.132 for DY2; -0.169 for DY3; -0.34 for DY4; -0.521 for DY5; -
0.602 for DY6.  
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In order to estimate the magnitude of the effect of the income class on the decision to 
support or not to support the proposal of income dependent premiums, we have set the 
explanatory variables to values that should represent a “typical individual” of the sample, 
e.g., a 50-year-old man with family, without an academic degree and living in a canton 
with high health insurance premiums. If an individual with these characteristics belongs to 
the third income class (DY3), there is a probability of supporting the proposal of 0.87. If 
this individual belongs to the fourth income class (DY4), the probability decreases to 0.75.  
The coefficients of the two-person and three-person household dummy variables are 
positive and significant. This result implies that, ceteris paribus, small households are less 
likely to accept health insurance premium dependent on income than three or more person 
households. Moreover, men appear, ceteris paribus, to be significantly less interested in 
increasing the degree of equity in financing the health services. Finally, people living in 
cantons characterized by high health insurance premiums are more likely to accept the 
proposal of income dependent premiums. 
7. Conclusions  
The main goal of this paper was to verify empirically the underlying hypothesis of 
Margolis (1982), namely that spending in group- interest is a superior good. We tested the 
fair-share model in the context of health care services, which in the most OECD countries 
are considered merit goods. After presenting the main features of the Swiss health care 
system, we particularly emphasized the strongly regressive financing of health care in 
Switzerland, which is due to the limited public participation in health care spending and to 
income-independent premiums for the mandatory health insurance. The willingness of the 
Swiss population to favor more vertical equity has been assessed with regard to the 
principle of introducing income dependent premiums in the mandatory health insurance. 
We applied the Binomial Logit model using micro data collected through a special survey 
carried out in 2002. It should be noted that people participating in the survey gave their 
opinion not on the base of a precise proposal (i.e. being aware of marginal benefits and 
costs) but only on the general principle of promoting vertical equity through income 
dependent health insurance premiums. For this reason, the results could vary by submitting 
a more precise proposal of income-dependent premiums. In this case the results of the 
econometric analysis reject the Margolis hypothesis of group-interest spending behaving as 
a superior good. Indeed, as household income increases, the likelihood of accepting a more 
equitable financing of health insurance decreases. However, it is intriguing to note that 
many individuals who earn more than the median income (i.e. people who will suffer a 
financial loss through a reform of the system) favor the more fair financing system. 
Finally, the econometric analysis shows that women are significantly more interested than 
men in increasing the degree of vertical equity, while small households (which are more 
affected by taxation and less by individual premiums) and people living in cantons 
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characterized by low health insurance premiums are less likely to accept income-dependent 
health insurance financing.  
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